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for hypotheses and immature generalizations, for the cautious judicial preference of this view or that, for the dogmatic rushing in of the less experienced where the wiser fear to tread.

To a helpful and interesting selection of types of problems, and an illuminating point of view, Professor Stratton adds the advantage of a presentation that is forcible and original, but most of all is realistic. There is no touch of the weary pedagogue tired of treading worn paths with new groups of charges; no showing, peddler-like, of novel wares with exaggerated encomiums of their value; but a keen and alert zest in handling problems that the author feels to be real and vital, breathing realities that walk and move, and not the conventional flat representations thereof, too familiar in text-books. Professor Stratton's volume makes no pretence to be a *magnum opus*; it is frankly eclectic; it is designed to meet a distinct, and, in some senses, a limited need. But because it meets that need with more than usual success, and because the service that it is likely to perform is one of peculiar timeliness, does the volume deserve a more than usual welcome.

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A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza. By HAROLD H. JOACHIM.
Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 1901.—pp. xiv, 366.

Spinoza's Political and Ethical Philosophy. By ROBERT A. DUFF.
Glasgow, James MacLehose & Sons; New York, The Macmillan Company, 1903.—pp. xii, 516.

If one undertook to collect evidence of the continued interest in metaphysical questions at the present time, the occupation of philosophical scholars with Spinoza would be a fact of much significance. For Spinoza takes us directly to the great fundamental problems regarding the nature and relations of God, man, and the world, and shows in a most convincing manner that upon the solution of these problems depend in a very real sense the practical issues of life. In spite of the somewhat pedantic and forbidding form in which he expressed his thought, the breadth and profundity of his insight and the clearness with which he perceived the vital and practical importance of fundamental problems, give a perennial interest to his philosophy. It is true that at the present time we cannot begin as Spinoza began, and that we are able to see that the method that he tried to employ is an impossible one. But if we follow Spinoza's spirit, refraining from passing judgments of censure and seeking simply to understand, we shall be able to see that the defects of his system are to a large extent

defects of form that are historically conditioned. Still further, as one understands Spinoza better, one must recognize that his thought is essentially modern, that he is leading the way, in the face of Descartes's dualism, to that idealistic and organic view of the world which did not find clear philosophic expression until more than a century after his death.

It is natural to compare Mr. Joachim's book with Sir Frederick Pollock's *Spinoza*, which was published more than twenty years earlier, and has since remained the standard work in English. The two books, however, have been written with an entirely different purpose and for a different class of readers. Pollock wrote primarily for the general reader, for those who do not know Spinoza at first hand, or who have been unable to find much meaning in the formally arranged propositions that compose his principal work. It is true that his interpretations of difficult passages and his historical elucidations of particular points have made the work indispensable to special students as well; nevertheless it is, in the best sense, a popular account of Spinoza's life and philosophy. Mr. Joachim, on the other hand, has provided a commentary to Spinoza's *Ethics*, a book that can only be used in close connection with the text. He has written, as he himself says, 'only for readers who wish to make a special study of Spinoza's philosophy.' He has therefore given a much more technical statement than we find in Pollock, keeping closer to the text, and occupying himself more with the systematic relations of Spinoza's thought.

The result seems to me in every respect a sound and valuable piece of work. The author displays excellent critical judgment and an insight that comes from a thorough acquaintance with Spinoza's writings as a whole, and from the most important literature of the subject. He does not hesitate to admit difficulties and to point out inconsistencies in Spinoza's system, but his criticisms are always of principles, not of petty details or verbal inconsistencies.

From the character of the book it naturally follows that it is impossible to give a summary or a running account of its contents in a review like the present. To take up for discussion particular questions on which the reviewer differs from the author's interpretation would also be unprofitable. I shall only call attention to the results of the author's study on one or two fundamental points that have been recognized as presenting special difficulties in the interpretation of the system.

First, regarding the Attributes. Mr. Joachim sums up his interpretation very clearly in four propositions: (1) "Each Attribute is a real character of what is." (2) "Each Attribute is an ultimate char-

acter of the real." (3) "Each Attribute includes the whole character which it expresses, and excludes all other characters." (4) "Each Attribute is coextensive with Substance ; or Substance is whole in all its Attributes, though different in each" (pp. 22-25). In defending the first proposition, it is shown (conclusively, I think) that the debate as to whether the attributes are to be regarded as 'subjective' or 'objective' is based on an antithesis which is quite foreign to Spinoza's thought. "Attribute is neither the Reality apart from knowledge, nor knowledge apart from Reality. . . . And it is a false abstraction which gives isolated being to either side of the antithesis" (p. 27). But with regard to Spinoza's doctrine of the relation of Substance and Attribute, as summed up in the fourth proposition just quoted, the author maintains that there is an inner contradiction. (1) "Substance and Attributes, the two moments in Spinoza's conception of God, involve the fusion of absolute unity and complete variety of character. Spinoza merely states the togetherness of the Attributes in God as a fact ; and again, he merely states as a fact that God comprehends in unbroken unity infinite variety of ultimate characters. (2) And Spinoza's conception of Attributes, or again of Substance, renders the intelligible coherence of the two moments of his complete conception of God impossible. There is an inner contradiction in his conception of God as at once excluding all determination, and comprehending an infinite variety of ultimate characters" (p. 106).

The exact content of Spinoza's conception of God has been a matter of much debate with the commentators. Mr. Joachim's conclusions on this point are summed up at the end of the first chapter of his second book : "The question has been much debated whether Spinoza's God is 'personal,' is 'self-conscious,' has 'intellect' and 'will.' In one sense all these predicates belong to God, so far as they express anything real. But God is not a person, nor is he self-conscious, nor has he intellect and will, in the sense which those terms would bear if unqualified. . . . Any of these terms, if applied to God, lose the distinctive meaning which popular thought gives them in their application to man. God is not indeed without these qualities — in the richness of his nature he is not less, but more than human ; so far as any human properties express reality, they must be expressed in God's completeness. . . . And in any case, the intellect and self-consciousness of God belong to him in his *modal* nature ; *i. e.*, he is not intellect any more than he is motion-and-rest. They are but partial expressions of his being, consequents of his substantial nature, and that nature is not exhausted in any or all of them" (pp. 144-45). This

is no place for extended criticism ; but it is possible, I think, to dissent from the statement that God is not intellect *any more*, or in a different sense, than he is motion-and-rest. For in self-consciousness, *i. e.*, in thinking himself, God's intelligence or thought ceases to be merely coördinate with the other Attributes, overlapping them and expressing in a more essential way the essence of his substance. And there is evidence too that Spinoza at least partially recognizes this distinction.

Mr. Duff's book is devoted to Spinoza's political and ethical ideas, a side of his philosophy that has been somewhat neglected in comparison with the attention which has been devoted to the metaphysical discussions of the *Ethics*. Mr. Duff insists that this neglect is an evidence of misunderstanding regarding Spinoza's main interest and purpose. "For it can be shown that Spinoza had no interest in metaphysics for its own sake, while he was passionately interested in moral and political problems. He was a metaphysician at all only in the sense that he was resolute in thinking *out* the ideas, principles, and categories which are interwoven with all our practical endeavor, and the proper understanding of which is the condition of human welfare. A true metaphysics meant to him true and adequate thinking of our own nature and of our place in the universe" (p. viii).

One may accept the latter part of this quotation, as well as the statement at the beginning of Chapter II that "the consideration of human *utilitas* is the dominating motive of all his [Spinoza's] speculation" (p. 12), without being prepared to grant "that Spinoza had no interest in metaphysics for its own sake." For this assertion seems to rest on an antithesis between the 'theoretical' and the 'practical,' that is false in fact and also entirely foreign to Spinoza's thought. For "the true and adequate thinking of our own nature and our place in the universe," is not an external means to some further independent end, but is rather an essential part of the end. Ultimately it is knowledge or complete understanding which gives permanent satisfaction to the deepest need of our nature ; while, at the same time, knowledge is never dissociated as an abstract principle from our concrete life as a whole. It may, however, be granted that it has been common to concentrate attention in a too abstractly theoretical way on Spinoza's metaphysical doctrines, forgetting that for him these are always connected with man's practical life. He was doubtless intensely interested in working out the best form of the State, holding that the generality of men, at least, could only attain a knowledge of their true good through its instrumentality. But it also seems clear, when we

consider Spinoza's doctrine of 'Intuition,' and of intellectual love towards God, that he believed that 'blessedness' — perhaps of a higher and more adequate type — could be attained by the independent power of individual reason. This path is exceedingly difficult, and there are few, he admits, who are capable of following it. The generality of men are led by their passions; nevertheless it is possible for the philosophical thinker to control his passions and be guided by an emotion that is not a passion, but is the result of complete insight and perfected activity. Mr. Duff's treatment of this point seems to me the least satisfactory part of his very able and suggestive book.

I have dwelt on this point at some length, because it seems to indicate a radical departure from the current way of interpreting Spinoza. Notwithstanding my opinion that a very important element of Spinoza's thought has been completely ignored, I cannot help feeling that Mr. Duff's book is of the highest importance, and takes rank at once with the best work that has appeared in the Spinoza literature. The author shows not merely an external familiarity with the text, but also proves that he has the ability to bring things together and exhibit points in their systematic relations. The book, however, is a long one (over five hundred, closely printed, large octavo pages), and gives (at least on first reading) an impression of diffuseness and some unnecessary repetition. It would be an advantage if the results of the various discussions were more frequently summed up at the end of the chapters.

The first half of the work deals with Spinoza's psychological analysis of human nature, as preparatory to a comprehension of the ethical and social theories which he erects upon this foundation. In this connection we have chapters dealing with "Man's Place in Nature," "Natural Necessity and Freedom of Will," "Unity and Difference," "Divine Determination," "The 'Conatus sese conservandi' and the Good," "Nature and Defects of the Passions," "Place and Function of Reason." Then follow chapters on "The Good as an Ideal Human Nature," "The Good as the Principle of Sociality," "The 'Jus Naturæ,'" "The 'Status Naturalis' and the Natural Man," "God's Laws and Human Laws," "The Fundamental Laws of Human Nature," "The Problem of Evil," "The 'Lumen Naturale' and the Idea of God in Man." The remaining chapters deal more directly with Spinoza's political theories and discuss the necessity, origin, powers, and functions of the State, and the various forms of political constitutions. The psychological chapters omit, as we have already mentioned, to take account of Spinoza's doctrine of Intuition, or to carry on the discussion to the fifth part of the *Ethics*. Apart from

this, however, they are eminently sound and enlightening. The chapters which deal with ethical topics seem to me particularly valuable, and bring out in a striking manner the essentially modern character of Spinoza's conceptions. Mr. Duff says in his preface: "This exposition of Spinoza may seem to borrow from later idealistic philosophy, and put to his credit principles which were developed only at a much later time. Of this I would only say that I have conscientiously tried to avoid doing this, and have, as far as space permitted, furnished the reader with the passages on which my interpretation of his thought is based." In the ethical chapters at least, it seems to me that, in the light of the passages which he has thus reproduced from Spinoza's writings, Mr. Duff must be acquitted of the charge of 'modernizing' his author.

One of the most interesting points in the exposition of Spinoza's political ideas is the clear distinction that is drawn between his theory and that of Hobbes, from whom some elements were certainly borrowed. Some of these differences had been already noted by Sir Frederick Pollock in his book on Spinoza. But the fundamental difference in spirit is more adequately brought out in Mr. Duff's more extended discussions. The difference is not merely that Spinoza maintains that there are certain limits to sovereignty, certain rights that the individual cannot give up, but rather that the purpose of the State is conceived differently by the two writers. For Hobbes the preservation of order, the peace and security of the individual, is the end of the state. For Spinoza the state is an instrument for the perfection of the nature of the individual. "Hence the only validity, or force, that any law ever has, or can have, comes . . . from the measure in which it recognizes and helps men to attain those satisfactions and ends of human desire in which God has ordained that they can alone find their happiness" (p. 332). This distinction in the conception of the end of the State is thus seen to involve a view of its relation to the individual which is fundamentally different from the Absolutism of Hobbes. For, on Spinoza's view, it is only as embodying right, and as leading the individual to a knowledge of the good, that the State can claim absolute authority. Apart from this moral sanction, it cannot command the obedience and allegiance of men, who by the very law of their nature can be governed only by that which their reason can learn to recognize as their own interest and good.

Both of these books are to be heartily welcomed as notable additions to the literature of Spinoza, and both, I think, deserve to rank with Pollock's work, so long a classic in this field.

J. E. CREIGHTON.